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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark Clayton Boman appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to traffic in heroin, claiming
(1) the district court erred by excluding his alibi witness as a sanction for a
discovery violation, and (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing
argument, although he did not object to the prosecutor's arguments at trial.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On January 20, 2010, Detective Clay Christensen with the Boise Police
Department received a call from postal inspector Rodd Herr indicating the post
office had a package he suspected contained a controlled substance.

(Tr.1,

p.175, Ls.6-16.) That same day an individual came to the post office inquiring
about the package. (Tr., p.177, Ls.4-10.) That individual left a phone number
and one of the post office employees also obtained his license plate number.
(Tr., p.178, Ls.19-21, p.179, Ls.15-19, p.361, L.8-p.365, L.16.)
The following day, Detective Christensen opened the suspicious package
and confirmed it contained a controlled substance, specifically, heroin.

(Tr.,

p.181, Ls.3-22.) As part of the investigation, Detective Robert Berrier conducted
surveillance on the residence to which the package was addressed - 222
Jackson Street, Apartment L. (Tr., p.261, Ls.7-15.) Detective Berrier began his

1

There are four transcripts included in the record on appeal. The only transcript
referred to in the Respondent's Brief is the trial transcript, which will be referred
to as "Tr."
1

surveillance at "[a]pproximately eight in the morning" on January 21, 2010. (Tr.,
p.261, Ls.7-18.)

Prior to conducting his surveillance, Detective Berrier was

provided a photograph of the individual who inquired about the package the
previous day. (Tr., p.261, Ls.19-23.) The individual depicted in the photograph
was identified as Boman. (Tr., p.262, Ls.7-9.)
During his surveillance of 222 Jackson, Apartment L, on January 21,
2010, Detective Berrier saw Boman "pulling in" at around 3:00 p.m. in a truck
matching the description of the truck driven by the individual who inquired about
the package at the post office on January 20, 2010. (Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.263,
L.7.) Boman entered Apartment L, staying less than five minutes before leaving
and going back to the post office where he was seen the previous day.

(Tr.,

p.263, Ls.8-13, p.264, Ls.9-19.) At the post office, Boman retrieved the package
containing heroin and left, driving back in the direction of 222 Jackson Street.
(Tr., p.190, L.3 - p.191, L.6.)

Officer Lance Nickerson was subsequently

directed to initiate a traffic stop on Boman, which he did. (Tr., p.502, Ls.5-15.)
Detective Christensen also participated in the traffic stop during which the heroin
was seized and Boman was arrested. (Tr., p.503, L.3 - p.504, L.3, p.190, L.21 p.192, L.10.) When asked about the package containing heroin, Boman said he
picked it up for Jesse Duran. (Tr., p.196, Ls.16-20.) Boman also stated "he was
a daily user of heroin" and said he had used heroin "that morning about 8 a.m."
(Tr., p.197, Ls.2-7.)
Detective Berrier continued his surveillance of 222 Jackson after Boman
left to retrieve the package from the post office. (Tr., p.264, Ls.14-23.) At around
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4:00 p.m., Detective Berrier "observed two individuals, a male and female, exit
out of Apartment L and begin walking across the apartment parking lot." (Tr.,
p.264, L.24 - p.265, L.3.) Detective Berrier made contact with those individuals
who identified themselves as Vicki Ornelas and Jesse Duran. (Tr., p.265, Ls.49.) In response to Detective Berrier's questions, Duran admitted he had heroin in
his pocket and drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.267, Ls.12-22.) Detective Berrier also
learned that Ornelas had $600 in her bra and a syringe. (Tr., p.268, Ls.1-5.) A
subsequent search of 222 Jackson, Apartment L uncovered numerous additional
syringes.

(Tr., p.268, Ls.6-18.)

Duran and Ornelas were also arrested.

(Tr.,

p.270, Ls.12-15.)
The state charged Boman with conspiracy to traffic in heroin (R., pp.7-9,
20-22, 34-36.) The state also charged Ornelas and Duran with the same offense
and the three cases were consolidated for trial.

(R., pp.12-13.)

On April 28,

2010, the state filed a discovery request, which included a request that Boman
"furnish the State with a list of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant
intends to call at trial."

(R., pp.54-55.)

That same request asked Boman to

disclose, within ten days, in writing and "[p]ursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519
... any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at
the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses
upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi." (R., pp.55-56.) Despite
the state's specific requests, Boman did not disclose an alleged alibi witness until

3

just prior to trial. 2 (Tr., p.275, Ls.6-15.) Counsel for Boman explained the late
disclosure was due to the fact that the "name was not disclosed to [him] until
quite recently" and that he was told that the witness "was not going to be able to
testify until ... his parole got revoked," which apparently occurred just prior to
Boman's trial. (Tr., p.275, L.24 - p.276, L.3; see also p.276, Ls.13-16.) Counsel
further represented that the witness, Herbert Hoyt, would testify that Boman was
in Salt Lake on January 20 and, therefore, could not have been at the post office
in Boise on that same date inquiring about the package containing heroin. 3 (Tr.,
p.276, Ls.7-11, p.277, L.23 - p.278, L.3; p.586, L.25 - p.587, L.2.) The state
moved to exclude Hoyt as a witness (Tr., p.275, Ls.17-19), and the court
reserved ruling until Hoyt could be transported to allow the state an opportunity to
talk to him (Tr., p.280, Ls.7-15).
Although the state had the opportunity to speak with Hoyt after he was
transported, Hoyt was "[n]ot cooperative." (Tr., p.583, Ls.21-25.) Moreover, the
state advised the court that, as a result of the late disclosure, it was unable to
"corroborate[]" or "invalidate[]" Hoyt's and Boman's claims regarding Boman's
whereabouts on January 20. (Tr., p.584, Ls.6-23.) The court granted the state's
motion to exclude Hoyt as a witness, concluding the disclosure was untimely and

2

Boman refers to the timing of his disclosure as "several days before trial
started" (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis omitted)), however, this
characterization is misleading given that the disclosure did not occur until the
Friday before the trial began on Monday.
3

During the discussion of what the alibi witness would allegedly say, Boman
represented to the court that he was in Utah "[a]II day on the 20th" and returned
on the 21st. (Tr., p.279, Ls.22-24.)
4

the state did "not have the ability ... to investigate to determine the reliability of
what the witness would testify to." (Tr., p.586, Ls.6-23; p.587, Ls.5-7.)
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Boman guilty
of the charged offense - conspiracy to traffic in heroin. (R., pp.173-174.) The
district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 15 years fixed.
pp.184-185.) Boman timely appealed. (R., pp.187-190.)

5

(R.,

ISSUES
Boman states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded Mr.
Boman's alibi witness as a sanction for a discovery violation?
2. Were Mr. Boman's constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial violated by the State's unobjected-to misconduct in closing
arguments?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Boman failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
excluding the testimony of an alibi witness who was not disclosed until what was
effectively the day before trial, which deprived the state of the ability to
investigate the alleged alibi?
2.
Has Boman failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object?

6

ARGUMENT

I.
Boman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Excluding The Testimony Of An Alibi Witness Who Was Not Disclosed Until The
Friday Before Boman's Trial Started On Monday
A.

Introduction
On the Friday prior to his trial that started on Monday, Boman disclosed

Hoyt as an alibi witness who would allegedly testify that Boman was in Utah on
January 20 during the time postal employees testified he was seen at the post
office attempting to pick up a package containing heroin. The court granted the
state's motion to exclude such testimony noting the late disclosure and the
state's inability to investigate the witness's claim.
Boman argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding Hoyt's testimony, contending the court "failed to balance any prejudice
asserted by the State against [his] right to a fair trial, and failed to consider lesser
sanctions before resorting to exclusion."

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Boman has

failed to show any basis for reversal, however, because he has failed to show
from the record either that the district court abused its discretion or that he was
actually prejudiced by the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, this Court reviews the record to determine if the finding of a

discovery violation is supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v.
Stradle'(, 127 Idaho 203, 207-208, 899 P.2d 416, 420-421 (1995).

However,

"[w]hether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of an
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appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court."

State v.

Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State
v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also State
v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[T]he trial court's
exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it
has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416,
421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)).
In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 456, 988 P.2d
680, 682 (1999) (citation omitted).

C.

Boman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Excluding Hoyt's Testimony
Idaho Code§ 19-519 states, in relevant part:
(1) At any time after arraignment before a magistrate upon a
complaint and upon written demand of the prosecuting attorney, the
defendant shall serve, within ten (10) days or at such different time
as the court may direct, upon the prosecuting attorney, a written
notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the
defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense
and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he
intends to rely to establish such alibi.

(4) Upon the failure of either party to comply with the
requirements of this section, the court may exclude the testimony of
8

any undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendant's
absence from or presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This
section shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify in his own
behalf.
(5) For good cause shown the court may grant an exception
to any of the requirements of subsections (1) through (4) of this
section.
Not only did Boman fail to disclose Hoyt as an alibi witness as required by
I.C. § 19-519, a fact which he admits (Appellant's Brief, p.8), there is no
indication in the record that he disclosed the fact of an alibi at all (see generally
R.), which is also required by I.C. § 19-519(1 ).

Nevertheless, Boman claims

excluding Hoyt as a witness was improper because, he asserts, the district court
"failed to balance any prejudice asserted by the State against [his] right to a fair
trial, and failed to consider lesser sanctions before resorting to exclusion."
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) In support of this argument, Boman first suggests that
the state had the burden of requesting "a postponement of trial" or "additional
time during which to investigate and prepare to rebut the anticipated testimony of
the alibi witness" before requesting exclusion.

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

According to Boman, the state instead "sandbagg[ed]" him by not "rais[ing] the
issue" until the second day of trial.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

These

arguments lack merit.
Boman has failed to cite any authority that stands for the proposition that
the state has an obligation to request a continuance before requesting exclusion,
and the state is aware of none.

Rather, if there was any burden beyond the

disclosure requirement itself, it was Boman's burden to show good cause why he
should be excused from the requirements governing alibis and alibi witnesses.

9

I.C. § 19-519(5); cf. Stradley, 127 Idaho at 209, 899 P.2d at 422 (rejecting
argument that state has a duty to mitigate late disclosure by a defendant).
Furthermore, while Boman claims he is "aware of the irony" of his argument that
the state was "sandbagging" (Appellant's Brief, p.13 n.3), he is apparently
unaware of what that word actually means. There is nothing in the record that
would support any claim that the state delayed raising the issue to the court to
gain some tactical advantage, nor is there any evidence that the state did not
attempt to contact Hoyt once Boman disclosed his name. To the contrary, the
prosecutor advised the court at the outset of trial on day two, which was a
Tuesday, that Boman had just disclosed an alibi witness the previous Friday and
that he sent his investigator to interview Hoyt that day.
p.279, Ls.3-6.)

(Tr., p.275, Ls.6-15;

Boman fails to explain precisely how the timing of the state's

notice to the court or its immediate response to the information constituted
sandbagging, he just boldly asserts that it does. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) If
Boman thought the issue needed to be presented to the court sooner to avoid
any unfair advantage to the state, perhaps he should have raised it.
Boman also argues that the district court erred in excluding Hoyt because
it "never considered less severe sanctions" and "never weighed any prejudice
that the State would suffer against [his] right to a fair trial." (Appellant's Brief,
p.13.) When deciding whether to exclude a defense witness as a sanction for a
discovery violation, the trial court must "balance the prejudice to the State due to
the lateness of disclosure against the defendant's right to a fair trial." State v.
Martinez, 137 Idaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v.
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Miller, 133 Idaho 454,457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999}; State v. Harris, 132 Idaho
843, 846-47, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (1999}; State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630,
633-34, 945 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1997}).

The court must also consider "less severe

remedies ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the evidence." State
v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v.
Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Ct. App. 1996); Harris, 132
Idaho at 846, 979 P.2d at 1204). Contrary to Boman's argument on appeal,
application of these principles to the facts of this case shows the district court
properly exercised its discretion in excluding Hoyt's testimony as a sanction for
Boman's failure to disclose him as a witness before trial.
Although the court did not expressly consider "less severe sanctions" or
specifically articulate that it weighed the prejudice to the state against Boman's
right to a fair trial, it does not necessarily follow that the court did neither. See
State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) ("The implicit
findings of the trial court, (i.e., that statements of the defendant made to the
police were voluntary and should not be suppressed) should be overturned only if
not supported by substantial evidence."}; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553,
961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference."). In fact, the
court discussed the prejudice when the state first raised the issue, and asked trial
counsel:
... So what does this do to the State's case? How do you check
this guy out? I mean that's the problem that the State has is how
do they check on the information to disprove what he says about

11

being in Utah because were there other people there that saw Mr.
Boman there or what do they do? What do they do now?
(Tr., p.276, L.25 - p.277, L.7.)
Counsel responded that he understood the concern and represented to
the court that Boman did not tell counsel the name "until very recently" because
Hoyt would not be "willing and able to testify" unless and until his parole was
revoked.

(Tr., p.276, Ls.11-16; p.279, Ls.8-17.)

In fact, counsel advised the

court that it was not necessarily his advice to call Hoyt as a witness, but Boman
was "quite eager to have him testify that he was in Salt Lake on the 20 th of
January." (Tr., p.277, L.24 - p.278, L.3.) The court indicated it did not know if it
would allow Boman to call Hoyt as a witness and advised it would make its
decision after the prosecutor had an opportunity to interview him. (Tr., p.278,
Ls.21-24.)

At that point, the prosecutor informed the court that the state's

investigator talked to Hoyt Friday afternoon after his name was disclosed, but the
state could not "corroborate" or "invalidate anything [Hoyt] [was] going to say
because of late disclosure." (Tr., p.279, Ls.3-7.) The court recognized, "[t]hat's
the problem." (Tr., p.279, L.13; see also L.18.)
After Hoyt was transported from jail and the prosecutor had the
opportunity to try and speak to him, the court addressed the matter again. The
prosecutor explained:
Judge, I had an opportunity last night to speak with [Hoyt].
Not cooperative with the State, I would say that. He was quite
upset having been here all day long and missing out on CAP
program and training.
So I had an investigator have a chance to speak with him
Friday afternoon. Obviously, I had a chance last night at 6:30 after
12

we got out of court to try and go talk with him. Again, the main
issue the State has with this, Judge, is he's providing information
that could be corroborated or may -- could be invalidated, but the
State doesn't have an opportunity to do so.
For example, he says he was stopped by police down in
Rupert. I am sure there is some type of a dispatch call that an
officer went out on saying he was stopping a vehicle. I can't
confirm that. He says that they got gas at a gas station in
Snowville, Utah. Again, there would be audio of that, video of that,
excuse me. I can't confirm that either. He says that there was a
witness that came and took the package and he knows that
witness's name, but he won't give me that witness's last name or
his address. There is just a lot of things that I can't corroborate with
that witness.
(Tr., p.583, L.23 - p.584, L.23.)
After the prosecutor expressed his concerns regarding the prejudice to the
state due to the late disclosure, defense counsel, in response to the court's
questions, stated his investigator had actually interviewed Hoyt "the middle of
July," but they "had some questions about whether [they] wanted to call Mr. Hoyt
at all." (Tr., p.585, Ls.13-19.) Trial counsel then stated he discussed the matter
with Boman on July 23 (two weeks before Hoyt was disclosed) and Boman
confirmed "he did want to talk to him" but counsel "still took that back and
discussed the matter," and "ultimately [only] revealed [Hoyt] when Mr. Boman
was fairly insistent" that he do so. (Tr., p.585, Ls.13-24.) Counsel also advised
the court that he had "filed a Freedom of Information Act request to the Rupert
police department requesting that they divulge any information on a traffic stop of
Mr. Hoyt's van on the 21 5 \ " but had not received a response (Tr., p.585, L.25 p.586, L.5), which was consistent with the state's position that it was not given
adequate time to investigate Hoyt's claims. The court responded:

13

All right. Looks like [counsel] and -- did his due diligence,
but the problem is, though, the State does not have the ability then
to investigate to determine reliability of what the witness would
testify to.
Under 19-519, it appears from the filing, the request for
discovery was filed April 28th and an alibi witness would have then
had to have been provided to the State looks like no later than May
8th. . . . [A]nd this trial wasn't scheduled until August. So there
was plenty of time to -- it appears Mr. Boman would have had
plenty of time to notify his attorney about the alibi witness and bring
it to the attention of the Court sooner than this coming up the first
day of trial. This is the first time I knew about it [The prosecutor]
apparently found out about it the Friday before.

Okay. So pursuant to 19-519, it appears that it is untimely
noticed and so Hebert Hoyt will not be allowed to testify.
(Tr., p.586, L.6 - p.587, L.7.)
Although the district court did not explicitly indicate it weighed the
prejudice against the state against Boman's right to a fair trial, the court's
comments clearly indicate an awareness and consideration of the prejudice to
the state resulting from the untimely disclosure, not only of the alibi witness but
the alibi itself, and the limited ability to investigate that alleged alibi.
Boman's assertion that the prejudice analysis also required the state to
explain the specific actions it had taken to investigate the alibi before asking for
exclusion is unsupported by any authority and the law does not appear to require
such.

Miller is instructive on this point.

In Miller, the trial court excluded the

testimony of a witness who was attempting to provide "expert" testimony because
the witness was not timely disclosed.

133 Idaho at 456, 988 P.2d at 682. In

doing so, the court stated:

14

Frankly, I can see where it would be advantageous to have
that testimony. But on the other side of the coin, fair is fair. I just
don't think you can spring an expert with that sort of testimony. On
the other side, I don't care whose side it is, without giving the
chance to at least meet it. And they're not given that chance.
[Objection] [s]ustained.
Miller, 133 Idaho at 457, 988 P.2d at 683.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, reasoning the trial
court "considered the defense's right to a fair trial and weighed the prejudice to
the State, he decided to exclude the witness' testimony on the basis that the
State had not prepared to meet undisclosed expert testimony." Miller, 133 Idaho
at 457, 988 P.2d at 457.

In reaching this conclusion, nowhere did the Court

suggest that, before a trial court could exclude the witness, the state was
required to detail what actions the state had or could take to rebut the testimony.
Rather, the only requirement is that the state "make a showing that it would [be]
prejudiced if the defense witness ... testified."

~

(citing Lamphere, 130 Idaho

at 634, 945 P.2d at 5). The state made the requisite showing in this case.
The record also supports the conclusion that the prejudice to the state
outweighed Boman's right to a fair trial. While Boman undoubtedly has the right
to present a defense, that right is not unfettered, and exclusion may be an
appropriate remedy for failing to comply with pre-trial disclosure deadlines.
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-411 (1988); State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284,
62 P.3d 208 (Ct. App. 2002).

Indeed, Boman's arguments regarding the

importance of Hoyt to his right to a fair trial are severely undermined by the fact
that he allowed this right to be governed by Hoyt's willingness to testify only if his
15

parole was revoked. Nor does Boman explain why he could not disclose the fact
of an alibi even if he would not disclose the name of his alibi witness until his alibi
agreed to testify.

Boman's acquiescence in Hoyt's conditional willingness to

testify weighs in favor of exclusion. As explained by the United States Supreme
Court in Taylor:
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate
and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they
would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there
are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the
prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process. One
of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk
that fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are
willing to fabricate a defense may also be willing to fabricate
excuses for failing to comply with a discovery requirement. The risk
of a contempt violation may seem trivial to a defendant facing the
threat of imprisonment for a term of years. A dishonest client can
mislead an honest attorney, and there are occasions when an
attorney assumes that the duty of loyalty to the client outweighs
elementary obligations to the court.
We presume that evidence that is not discovered until after
the trial is over would not have affected the outcome. It is equally
reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a
defense witness who is not identified until after the 1 fh hour has
passed.
484 U.S. at 413-414 (footnote omitted).
Thus, while, as Boman argues, less drastic sanctions are always
available, this does not mean the trial court is required to pursue a remedy other
than exclusion, particularly under circumstances such as those present in
Boman's case. 4 See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413-414. "Given the ease with which

4

Contrary to Boman's assertion on appeal, exclusion is not limited to "extreme
cases, mainly those involving defense misconduct." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
Taylor, the case upon which Boman relies for that assertion, does not support
such a broad rule. Rather, while Taylor involved defense misconduct, the Court
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an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an
eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 81 (1970).

Boman intentionally withheld the fact of an alibi from the

state and waited to disclose his alibi witness until after that witness decided he
would be willing to testify because his parole was revoked, and even then, the
witness was not disclosed until Boman became insistent that he testify.

This

tactic, in conjunction with the suspect validity of Hoyt's testimony in that it was
predicated on revocation of his parole, Hoyt's lack of cooperation in being
interviewed by the state, and the state's inability to corroborate or invalidate
Hoyt's claims in the midst of trial, support the district court's conclusion that
exclusion was a proper remedy. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414-415 ("The integrity
of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable
evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and
efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-

specifically said it was "neither necessary nor appropriate ... to attempt to draft a
comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every
possible case." 484 U.S. at 414. In fact, the only reference in Taylor that
supports a claim that exclusion is limited to "extreme cases" is in a footnote
where the Court indicates that "in Illinois, the sanction of preclusion is reserved
for only the most extreme cases." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417 n.23 (emphasis
added). The Court never adopts this view. If anything, Taylor simply supports
the proposition that defense misconduct can elevate a case beyond the normal
weighing that would occur and allows exclusion even if the prejudice to the state
is minimal and other lesser sanctions are available. ~ at 417 ("Regardless of
whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided in this particular
case, it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which
the severest sanction is appropriate."); see Albert, 138 Idaho at 287, 62 P.3d at
211 (where "discovery violation was willful and designed to facilitate the
presentation of fabricated testimony or to impede the State's ability to conduct
effective cross-examination or to present rebuttal evidence," "untimely-disclosed
defense evidence may be excluded notwithstanding the availability of other
sanctions that would prevent prejudice to the State") (citations omitted).
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determining function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance.").
Boman has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

D.

Even If Error, The Exclusion Of Hoyt's Testimony Was Harmless
'"Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test is whether there

is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207,209,804 P.2d
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991 )). The district court properly exercised its discretion in
excluding Hoyt's testimony.

However, even if error, the exclusion of the

testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable probability under the
facts of this case that the exclusion contributed to Boman's conviction.
Although Boman's presence at the post office on January 20 was a
component of the state's case against him, it was not necessary to his conviction
because it was among several other acts alleged by the state in support of the
conspiracy charge.

(See R., pp.156-157.) The jury was instructed that it was

only required to find that only one of the parties to the conspiracy (Boman,
Duran, or Ornelas) "performed at least one of the following acts":
a.
On or between the 1st day of January, 2010, and the 21st
day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran contacted a heroin source in
California and ordered the heroin and/or
b.
On or between the 1st day of January2, 201 0,and the 21st
day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran and/or Vicki Ornelas and/or
Mark Boman provided funds to pay for the heroin and/or
c.
On or between the 1st day of January, 2010, and the 21st
day of January, 2010, Jesse Duran wired and/or sent funds to
heroin source in California and/or
18

d.
On the 20th day of January, 2010, Mark Boman and Vicki
Ornelas contacted the U.S. Post Office in order to ascertain the
location of the package of heroin and/or take custody of the
package of heroin, and/or
e.
On the 20th day of January, 2010, Mark Boman provided a
contact number to the U.S. Post Office for notification of arrival of
the package of heroin and/or
f.
On the 21st day of January, 2010, Jesse E. Duran directed
Mark Boman to pick up heroin, and/or
g.
On the 21st day of January, 2010, Mark Boman picked up
the heroin from the U.S. Post Office and/or
h.
On the 21st day of January, 2010, Mark Boman was in
possession of the heroin and transported it in order to deliver the
heroin to Jesse E. Duran and/or Vicki Ornelas.
(R., pp.156-157 .)
Because Boman's presence in Idaho on January 20 was only included in
two of the eight over acts alleged and because the jury could convict Boman
based on a finding that the parties to agreement engaged in the other six acts, of
which there was substantial evidence, even if the jury believed testimony from
Hoyt that Boman was in Utah on January 20, the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony, if
error, was harmless.
More likely, however, is that the jury would have rejected Hoyt's testimony
altogether given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that Boman was
actually at the post office on January 20. Amy Farnham, a post office employee,
testified that on January 20, 2010, Boman came to inquire about the package.
(Tr., p.360, L.14 - p.362, L.18; p.365, L.20 - p.366, L.14.)

Farnham gave a

detailed description of the person who came to the post office that date and
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positively identified Boman as that person at trial. (Id.) On January 20, Farnham
also got a description of the truck being driven by the individual who came to
inquire about the package, including the license plate. (Tr., p.364, L.19 - p.365,
L.16.) Further investigation revealed that truck was registered to Boman. (Tr.,
p.311, L.4 - p.312, L.12; p.496, L.11 - p.500, L.8.) Farnham also testified that
the same individual who came to the post office on January 20 to inquire about
the package, returned on January 21 to retrieve the package, and was driving the
same truck. (Tr., p.367, L.4 - p.368, L.19.)
Another postal

employee,

John

Stinchcomb,

confirmed

Farnham's

testimony in that he was the individual who actually handed the package to
Boman on January 21. (Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.392, L.4.) Surveillance of Boman on
January 21 corroborated Farnham's and Stinchcomb's testimony, as did the fact
that Boman was driving the truck identified by Farnham and was in possession of
the package when he was arrested. (Tr., p.188, L.6-p.192, L.21; p.214, L.11 p.216, L.6; p.261, L.7- p.264, L.20; p.286, L.21 - p.289, L.21.)
Ornelas also confirmed Boman's involvement in the heroin conspiracy.
Ornelas testified that when she moved here from California in November 2009 to
live with Duran (at 222 Jackson Street), Boman and Duran were working
together. (Tr., p.429, Ls.4-25; p.431, Ls.18-21.) Ornelas and Duran also relied
on Boman for rides. (Tr., p.440, L.24 - p.441, L.9.) In December 2009, Boman
would come over for short visits with Duran and talk about drugs and obtaining
money to buy drugs. (Tr., p.441, L.12 - p.442, L.4.) In particular, Boman and
Duran discussed splitting the cost of a "piece" of heroin, which is approximately
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24 grams. (Tr., p.442, L.23 - p.443, L.10.) According to Ornelas, this occurred
approximately once per week, and this testimony was consistent with the
testimony of William Gans, a post office employee, who testified that similar
express mail packages were sent to 222 Jackson Street on January 8, January
15, and January 20, 2010. (Tr., p.321, L.8 - p.322, L.7; p.325, L.11 - p.326, L.7;
p.327, Ls.5-15; p.445, Ls.12-18; p.447, Ls.16-18.) Ornelas testified that Duran
would order the heroin from California and it would be shipped by mail.

(Tr.,

p.446, L.17 - p.447, L.11.) Ornelas received the package at least twice. (Tr.,
p.447, Ls.19-25.)
Ornelas further testified that she saw Boman and Duran with the heroin,
"cutting it up" and "[p]utting it in baggies." (Tr., p.448, Ls.8-16.) In fact, on one
occasion Ornelas got angry with Boman for cutting the heroin with sugar. (Tr.,
p.458, Ls.19-25.)

Duran then sold the heroin in grams and half grams.

(Tr.,

p.462, L.19 - p.464, L.21.)
With respect to what occurred on January 20, Ornelas testified that Duran
called Boman "to see if he could get [them] some heroin" because they did not
have any and they were "sick." (Tr., p.468, L.14 - p.469, L.9.) Boman indicated
that he wanted to "go in on it." (Tr., p.474, Ls.1-20.)
Ornelas also testified that on January 21, Boman called Duran and said
the post office called him and told him the package was available for him to pick
up. (Tr., p.470, L.2 p.471, L.2.) Boman subsequently came to the apartment
where Duran and Ornelas lived and gave them "a couple grams." (Tr., p.471,
Ls.15-20.) Boman then left to go pick up the package from the post office. (Tr.,
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p.472, L.24 - p.473, L.14.) After Boman left, Ornelas and Duran also left the
apartment at which time they were contacted by law enforcement and arrested.
(Tr., p.475, L.23 - p.476, L.4.) Boman's actions on January 21, as recounted by
Ornelas, were consistent with the testimony of the surveillance officers.
The evidence at trial overwhelmingly pointed to Boman's guilt. Given the
weight of the evidence, any error in the exclusion of Hoyt's testimony could not
reasonably have affected the outcome of the case and was therefore harmless.
Boman has failed to show any basis for reversal.

11.
Boman Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His
Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Boman claims two statements included in the prosecutor's closing

remarks, which were not objected to, were misconduct amounting to fundamental
error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-17.) Specifically, Boman claims the prosecutor
committed misconduct during closing argument by allegedly shifting the burden
of proof and "misrepresent[ingJ the evidence.'' (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Review
of these claims shows no fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
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on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error. Id. at 980.

C.

Boman Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument
Boman contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing

argument by "misrepresent[ing]" evidence when he stated, in closing argument,
that Boman "forged" Duran's signature when he picked up the heroin package
and by highlighting the absence of any evidence that Boman was "somewhere
else," thereby taking advantage of successfully excluding evidence of Boman's
alleged alibi. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perry, unobjected to
claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at_, 245 P.3d 978.
Application of the foregoing standard to Boman's claims of unpreserved
error demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled
to reversal of his conviction.
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1. Alleged Misrepresentation Of Evidence Was Not Fundamental Error
In discussing the elements of the lesser included offense of possession of
heroin, the prosecutor stated, without objection:
And did he intend to possess it?
A person has
possession of something if he knows of its presence, has physical
control of it and/or has the power and intention to control it. Mark
Boman intended to possess both the baggie that he gave to Jesse
Duran and Vicki Ornelas as well as the package. Why? Because
had he (sic] physical control, physical control of both of those items.
They were in his seat. He signed for it. He forged (Duran's]
signature to get that package. He intended to control that package.
(Tr., p.667, Ls.14-25.)
Boman argues that the reference to Boman "forg(ing]" Duran's signature
was an improper misrepresentation of the evidence because "postal employee
John Stinchcomb, testified ... that, in his experience, it was 'not out of the
ordinary' for someone to sign the addressee's name when retrieving a package
for another person" and because "under Idaho law, (forgery] requires the 'intent
to defraud."'

(Appellant's Brief, p.15 (citing Tr., p.390, L.3 - p.393, L.14).)

Boman also complains that the reference violated I.R.E. 404(b).

(Appellant's

Brief, p.16.) Boman's arguments fail to satisfy the first prong of Perry.
It is clear from the context of the prosecutor's argument that he was
merely trying to establish that by picking up the heroin package, and signing
Duran's name, Boman had the intent to possess the package and the heroin
contained therein. While use of the word "forged" may not have been accurate in
terms of whether the crime of forgery was committed, that was not what the state
was attempting to demonstrate and characterizing the prosecutor's use of the
word "forged" as a misrepresentation of the evidence is only true in a technical
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sense divorced from the facts of the case. In context, the prosecutor's use of the
word "forged" did not violate any of Boman's constitutional rights. Further, with
respect to Boman's 404(b) argument, any claimed violation of that rule would not
qualify as constitutional error. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77,
83-84 (Ct. App. 2011) (concluding "the requirements set forth in I.RE. 404(b),
regarding admissibility and notice, are not of constitutional import" and noting
prior cases rejecting claims that evidentiary error rises to the level of fundamental
error).
Even if Boman could satisfy the first prong of Perry, his argument fails on
the second and third prongs. Indeed, Boman makes no attempt to explain why
the alleged error is clear or obvious and does not require additional information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision.

With respect to

whether the error was harmless, Boman argues the evidence was not harmless
because, according to him, "[c]ommon sense dictates that wrongly accusing [him]
of committing a separate crime related to picking up the package would make it
more likely that a jury would believe that [he] was a person of bad character with
a propensity to commit crimes."

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

To suggest, as

Boman's argument does, that the comment that Boman "forged" Duran's
signature, made in relation to the prosecutor's argument regarding the elements
of the lesser included offense of possession on which Boman was not convicted,
tipped the scales and convinced the jury that he was guilty of the great offense of
trafficking in heroin, ignores the record and falls far short of demonstrating the
word "forged" affected the outcome of the proceedings.
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Boman has failed to show inclusion of the word "forged" in the
prosecutor's closing argument qualifies as fundamental error entitling him to
reversal of his conviction.

2. The Prosecutor's Comment Regarding The Lack Of Evidence That
Boman Was Somewhere Else Was Not Fundamental Error
Boman argues that the prosecutor also committed misconduct when, in
closing argument, and without objection, he stated "Have you heard any
evidence that Mark Boman was anywhere else?" (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The
statement was made in the following context during the prosecutor's discussion
of the evidence proving the acts alleged in the conspiracy:
The other thing that's on D [in element 6 of Instruction No. 11 ), is
that Mark Boman and Vicki Ornelas contacted the Post Office in
order to ascertain the location of the package. Has that been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt? Have you heard any evidence
that Mark Boman was anywhere else?
How would, how would Amy Farnham, a postal worker, who
doesn't know Tom from Joe be able to get a license plate who the
registered owner is Mark Boman who is friends with Jesse Duran
who happened to be into a heroin agreement out of the blue? How
does that happen?
I submit it doesn't happen. It's not a conspiracy by postal
workers to frame [Boman) on that day. That's not it. [Boman) was
there. He was present. They identified him. They got his license
plate and they got a phone number.
(Tr., p.661, L.18 - p.662, L.9.)
While it would have been advisable for the prosecutor to avoid
commenting on the absence of evidence that Boman was "anywhere else,"
compare State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (1991)
(improper to argue victim's chastity after getting evidence of sexual history
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excluded, but error harmless), instead of just focusing on the evidence of his
presence, that passing reference hardly demonstrates a violation of any of
Boman's constitutional rights, much less behavior that was so egregious that this
Court should accept Boman's invitation to send "a message . . . that such
behavior will not be tolerated" (Appellant's Brief, p.17).

See Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) ("[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors'
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982)
("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.").
Further, even if constitutional error, Boman has failed to establish either
that the error was clear or obvious and the lack of objection was not the result of
a tactical decision or that the result of the trial would have been different absent
the comment.

Indeed, while Boman wanted to introduce an alibi for his

whereabouts on January 20, his attorney was clearly reluctant to do so, instead
focusing on what occurred on January 21 and arguing that Boman did not know
what was contained in the package because, regardless of whether Boman could
have (or should have been able to) produce evidence of an alibi on January 20, it
could not be disputed that he was found in possession of the heroin on January
21. (See Tr., p.671, Ls.7-24.) For this reason, and the reasons set forth above
regarding the strength of the evidence implicating him in the conspiracy to traffic

27

heroin, any error related to the prosecutor's comment in closing argument about
the absence of any evidence that Boman was anywhere else was harmless.
Because Boman has failed to show fundamental error with respect to any
of his unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct, he has failed to show
any basis for review of those claims, much less grounds for reversal.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Boman's judgment of
conviction for conspiracy to traffic in heroin.
DATED this 29 th day of November, 2011.

JESSICA . LORELLO
Deput~,A orney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of November 2011, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JESSICA . LORELLO
Deputy A orney General

28

